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In my opening article,1 I took the position that although the Recess  
Appointments Clause2 is traditionally imagined as merely a grant of  
authority to the President, it grants a coordinate power to the Senate.  If the 
Senate chooses to end its next session, the President’s recess appointment 
has been terminated. 
Professor Kalt acknowledges that the end of the Senate’s session  
terminates a recess appointment, even if the recess is made only for an  
instant and only for the purpose of terminating recess appointees.3  Beyond 
that, he voices some thoughtful constitutional objections to my proposal.  
Finally, he suggests that the proposed innovation, which he colorfully calls 
a “Tillman adjournment,” is muddled by “practical problems” rendering it 
“pointless at best.”4
I. WHAT PRECISELY IS IN DISPUTE? 
I argue that Senate regular sessions can be terminated and new ones 
convened by the Senate independently of the House, particularly if the 
break were only for a moment.5  Furthermore, I argue that Senate executive 
or special sessions, including ones convened by the President, may also be 
terminated by the Senate acting alone. 
Kalt, on the other hand, argues that the termination of a Senate  
legislative session requires bicameral action (although the President’s con-
 ∗ Mr. Tillman is an associate of Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, and is a 
member of the Delaware bar.  The views expressed do not necessarily represent the views of the firm or 
its clients.  
1 Seth Barrett Tillman, Senate Termination of Presidential Recess Appointments, 101 NW. 
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 82 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/2/ (link).    
2 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (link). 
3 Brian C. Kalt, Keeping Recess Appointments in Their Place, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 88, 
90 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/3/ (link).   
4 Id. at 88-89. 
5 Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (link) (“Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, 
without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days . . . .”). 
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sent is not needed6), and that the termination of a Senate special session 
called by the President requires the consent of the President (although the 
House’s consent is not needed7). 
Kalt is not disputing my end-of-the-Senate’s-session-terminates-the-
appointment thesis.  He is not disputing the principle; he is only haggling 
over the price. 
II. WHO CAN END A SPECIAL SENATE SESSION CALLED BY THE 
PRESIDENT? 
My position follows from the Constitution’s text.  The Recess  
Appointments Clause states that recess appointments are terminated “at the 
End of their next Session.”8  As a textual matter, “their” refers expressly to 
the Senate, not to the Congress as a whole.9  That is some reason to believe 
that the Senate controls its own sessional structure, at least absent a prior 
statute—to which the Senate consented—withdrawing this power.  At a 
more structural level, to the extent that cameral autonomy is a recognized 
constitutional norm, the injection of the President into intra-Senate affairs 
would be improper.10
Kalt, on the other hand, argues that the Senate “cannot functionally  
adjourn” special sessions of the Senate called by the President, “if the  
President is not ready to allow it.”11  However, Kalt does not state that the 
Senate lacks the constitutional power to recess and to reconvene itself in 
these circumstances.  Moreover, he puts forward no on-point authority for 
his belief that Presidential approval is necessary.  He does cite Article II, 
Section 3,12 but that provision only grants the President a power to  
“convene” the two houses (or either of them); it does not expressly grant a 
power to keep them in session once they have met, particularly if in the 
Senate’s own judgment it has fairly considered the President’s business.13  
The Constitution nowhere describes the Senate as the President’s council. 
 
6 Kalt, supra note 3, at 89-90. 
7 See id. at 90-91. 
8 Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (referring to Senate sessions) (link), with id. at art. I, § 5, 
cl. 4 (addressing “the Session of Congress” which may or may not be the same thing) (link).   
9 Id. at art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (link); id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (link).  The fact that the text distinguishes the 
Session of Congress from the sessions of the Senate does not preclude structural inferences suggesting 
that the two are identical or that the former subsumes the latter.  However, Kalt makes no such  
argument. 
10 See generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, If the Judicial Confirmation Process is Broken, Can a 
Statute Fix It?, 85 NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=920871 
(link). 
11 Kalt, supra note 3, at 90-91. 
12 Id. at 90, n.13 (citing Article II, Section 3, which provides that the President “may, on extraordi-
nary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them . . .”). 
13 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 338 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003) (link) 
(“The President can only adjourn the national Legislature in the single case of disagreement about the 
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Moreover, although Kalt states that the President has an “unquestioned 
power to convene (and reconvene, and re-reconvene) the Senate,”14 the 
Constitution’s text expressly limits this power to “extraordinary  
Occasions.”15  Does Kalt seriously contend that a mere interbranch dispute 
over a mundane recess appointment is an “extraordinary Occasion”?  Even 
after the Senate has rejected the appointment by going into recess and  
reconvening?16   
Additionally, Kalt points to the “tradition” of ending special Senate 
sessions called by the President “only after the Senate formally asked the 
President if he had any further business.”17  Kalt then acknowledges, in a 
footnote, that this is not an unbroken tradition.18  He rationalizes the  
exceptions by suggesting that the “usual [Senate] procedure . . . was just 
lost in a shuffle of other matters.”19  Even assuming the latter  
characterization to be correct, Kalt, I believe, errs methodologically here.  
The relevant question is not why the Senate failed to ask the President if he 
had further business for the members before they ended their session, but 
whether or not the President acquiesced in the affront to his purported 
power to terminate the session.  If he acquiesced, then that ratifies the  
correctness of the Senate’s procedure.20  Furthermore, in matters of disputed 
parliamentary procedure “one precedent in favor of power is stronger than 
an hundred against it.”21
However, weighing precedent is not necessary.  At most, the examples 
supporting Kalt’s position prove only that the Senate has displayed a  
willingness to act with comity towards the Executive Branch, i.e., to make 
the traditional inquiry.  His examples do not prove that the Senate was  
constitutionally required to do so.  Kalt sees a legislative body acting  
responsibly and civilly, and assumes that this must mean that the members 
were constrained to do so by the Constitution. 
 
time of adjournment.  [But] [t]he British monarch may prorogue or even dissolve the Parliament.”).  The 
British monarch’s power to prorogue a session included the concomitant power to keep Parliament in 
session against the wishes of its members (who only had the limited power to take intrasession  
adjournments).  Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison), supra, at 258 (link) (noting that an Irish  
Parliament sat for 35 years and new elections were at the discretion of the crown). 
14 Kalt, supra note 3, at 90-91. 
15 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (link). 
16 See Kalt, supra note 3, at 93 n.17 (taking the position that if the President subsequently appoints a 
nominee to an office after actual rejection by the Senate, “the Senate’s power to reject nominees would 
be reduced to a near nullity, which at the very least is structurally problematic”).  
17 Id. at 90-91. 
18 See id. at 91, n.14. 
19 Id. (citing exclusively Senate records). 
20 Cf. William Ty Mayton, Recess Appointments and an Independent Judiciary, 20 CONST. 
COMMENT. 515, 551 (2004) (link) (arguing that ratification “by the other branches” is the essential test 
of a disputed separation of powers claim where resolution is sought via historical analysis). 
21 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 226 (1782) (link).  
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III. WHO CAN END A SENATE REGULAR SESSION? 
In my opening article, I explained that it is not clear if the Senate  
acting alone can terminate its regular session and reconvene absent consent 
of the House,22 and that a Tillman adjournment may or may not require the 
House’s consent.  Part of the difficulty is that authorities are divided with 
regard to the meaning of “session” and “recess” in the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause.23  Most commentators acknowledge that it is not clear what 
counts as a recess and what counts as a session—or, more importantly, what 
institutions can terminate or (re)start them. 
Although I have some doubts,24 Kalt has none.  He resoundingly  
affirms:  “The Constitution provides, and uniform historical practice con-
firms, that a regular session ends when the Senate and House agree that it 
ends . . . .”25   
To buttress his position, Kalt cites, without supporting analysis, no less 
than four constitutional provisions.26  Not one of these clauses expressly 
discusses the Senate’s next session or a recess of the Senate—the two  
operative phrases within the Recess Appointments Clause.  Admittedly, 
these clauses discuss adjournments, but the term adjournment is not coex-
tensive with recess.  An adjournment may carry prior business forward, 
while a recess terminates prior legislative business.27  The distinction is a 
functional one. 
IV. WHEN MIGHT THE SENATE RECESS BY TERMINATION OF PRIOR 
BUSINESS?  
Article I, Section 5, Clause 4 states:  “Neither House, during the  
Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for 
more than three days . . . .”  If the “Session of Congress” were coextensive 
 
22 Tillman, supra note 1, at 85-86. 
23 See, e.g., Henry B. Hogue, Recess Appointments:  Frequently Asked Questions, Cong. Res. Serv. 
Rep. No. RS21308, at 2–3 (Jan. 16, 2007) (link) (noting that the “End of their [the Senate’s] next  
session . . . is not precisely defined”); Michael Herz, Abandoning Recess Appointments?:  A Comment 
on Hartnett (and Others), 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 443, 447 (2005) (link) (“The text here is again uncer-
tain; ‘recess’ is not a precise term of art.”). 
24 Tillman, supra note 1, at 85-86. 
25 Kalt, supra note 3, at 89. 
26 Id. at 89 n.8 (citing Article II, Section 3; Article I, Section 5, Clause 4; Article I, Section 7,  
Clause 3; Amendment XX, Section 2); see supra note 9. 
27 Compare THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE § 51, at 109 (New 
York, Clark Austin & Smith 1856) (link) (explaining that all matters “before Parliament were discontin-
ued by the determination of the session”), with id. at 108 (“All matters [unresolved at adjournment] re-
main in status quo, and when they meet again, be the term ever so distant, as resumed without any fresh 
commencement . . . .”).  See email from Harry Evans, Clerk of the Senate, Parliament of Australia, to 
author (Feb. 2, 2007) (link) (on file with Colloquy) (“The ideas of going into recess and discharging 
business are so closely linked in the parliamentary mind that it would be difficult to persuade most peo-
ple that you could have a recess without discharging at least some business.”).    
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with the two-year House term it would be pure surplusage.  I suggest that at 
its limit the “Session of Congress” refers to that time between the conven-
ing of a new two-year Congress (as set by statute of the outgoing Congress, 
or per Amendment XX) and sine die adjournment.28   
Outside of the “Session of Congress,” between sine die adjournment 
and the first meeting of a successor Congress, each house could convene 
and terminate independently of the other under the authority of an authoriz-
ing rule or statute.  Should the Senate try to terminate appointees at other 
times, a more complex analysis may be called for.    
Is Article II, Section 3, which states that the President “may convene 
both Houses, or either of them,” counter-authority?  Kalt seems to read this 
as an exclusive power of the President.29  I suggest the opposite:  our sys-
tem of separation of powers rejected executive prerogative over the legisla-
tive houses.  For the President to have any authority over legislative 
proceedings, an express grant was necessary.  Such grants, standing alone, 
do not oust the houses of control over their own proceedings, including the 
timing of their sessions.30
Consider:  if the President were the only actor who could convene a 
lone-house, then notwithstanding a long inter-Congress recess—which were 
frequent in the nineteenth century—the House would have no power to con-
vene itself to start a preliminary investigation of executive branch or presi-
dential wrongdoing.  Structurally, does it make sense to subjugate the 
House’s expressly granted impeachment power to an inference about presi-
dential power? 
As to the historical practices cited by Kalt, I readily concede a long-
enduring useful tradition of interhouse comity with regard to scheduling 
joint business by resolution or by statute.  But that tradition of comity, 
without more, cannot establish the full constitutional limit of either house’s 
power.  If Kalt is going to use history to make his point, then he must point 
to some concrete evidence suggesting that the members of past Congresses 
believed they had to act as they did, not merely that they chose to do so.  
None of my weak arguments above proves Kalt wrong or the more 
ambitious of my two positions correct (single-house recess and reconven-
ing, not bicameral).  Still, Kalt has laid the historical and legal foundation 
for what might be a powerful rejoinder, but that is all he has done.31  He has 
laid a foundation; he has not built a house. 
 
28 Cf. Ashley v. Keith Oil Co., 7 F.R.D. 589, 591–92 (D. Mass. 1947) (Wyzanski, J.).   
29 See supra note 26; Edward A. Hartnett, Recess Appointments of Article III Judges:  Three  
Constitutional Questions, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 377, 423 (2005) (link) (arguing that President has sole 
power to call Congress into extraordinary sessions). 
30 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cls. 1, 2 (link) (granting each house the power to compel absent 
members to attend and the power to determine its own rules without regard to any extant “Session of 
Congress”). 
31 See Kalt, supra note 3, at 89 n.8 (citing four constitutional provisions without analysis). 
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V. INTERBRANCH RIVALRIES? 
The larger purpose of the Tillman adjournment, as I conceive it, is to 
create incentives for the Senate to act like a properly constituted parliamen-
tary body, so that public elections actually decide issues.  The goal is to ad-
dress a dysfunctional Senate, not overreaching Presidents.  Kalt, conceiving 
the Tillman adjournment as a new tool of interbranch rivalry,32 concludes 
that “[n]o president would take such an unprecedented and aggressive  
action by the Senate lying down.”33  The dispute here is one about purpose 
and practical effects. 
First, an incoming President or President-elect might ask the Senate to 
terminate his outgoing predecessor’s recess appointment to an Article III 
court, an appointee not directly subject to his removal power. 
Second, Senate termination would sometimes have the significant  
effect of turning a presidential appointee with a two-year term (from a con-
stitutionally-suspect intrasession appointment) into a presidential appointee 
with a single-year term (from a constitutionally-valid intersession appoint-
ment).  So even if the appointee is reappointed, as Kalt suggests would  
occur,34 the Senate will have achieved something desirable. 
Third, mistakes happen.  A president whose candidate was terminated 
by the Senate might reconsider his appointment in the context of his overall 
agenda. 
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPROPRIETIES? 
Kalt argues that the involvement of the House in the termination of  
recess appointments is an “impropriety” and that it is “grossly inconsistent 
with the Constitution’s clear structure” because it involves the House in the 
“appointment process”35 which should be a purely Senate-President dy-
namic. 
As a formalistic matter, I believe Kalt errs.  Even if I conceded House 
involvement, the Tillman adjournment involves the House in termination of 
officers from office; it does not involve the House in their appointment.36
Formalism aside, I admit that I am perplexed by Kalt’s constitutional 
intuition here.  Having already conceded that the Constitution permits the 
Tillman adjournment, Kalt cannot turn around and argue that members’ 
 
32 See id. at 88 (positing that the Tillman adjournment is “a clever way for the Senate to respond” to 
the President).   
33 Id. at 92. 
34 Id.  
35 Id. at 89.   
36 But compare Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 725–27 (1986) (link) (denying, in dicta, propriety 
of congressional removals), with Applicability of Appointment Provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
of 1988 to Incumbent Officeholders, 12 OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 286, 288 n.4 (1988) (Asst. Att’y Gen. 
Kmiec) (conceding, post-Bowsher, that “Congress can, of course, enact legislation permanently abolish-
ing an office, in which case the incumbent would no longer have a position to occupy”). 
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making use of that power in good faith contravenes the constitutional  
design, unless we either (1) identify the Constitution with those provisions 
that have been executed or adjudicated to date, or (2) identify our contin-
gent historical experience with the complete potential of the founders’  
design, intent, or expectations.37
 
37 See Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA 
L. REV. 1487, 1565–66 & nn.238–239 (2005) (link) (arguing that “it is by no means clear that the Fram-
ers would have desired to prevent Congress from” constraining the President’s recess appointments 
power through strategic ex ante scheduling of recesses).   
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